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THE ECONOMY 2. TANZANIA FORCED TO SIGN - KV1NYI
Speaking at the Peasants Day celbrations in Shinyanga on July 7th 
1987 President Mwlnyi said that people should not lose hope because of 
the current economic hardships but rather they should face them 
squarely. Tanzania would succeed in building a strong economy if the 
people worked hard.
The Government had been forced to sign the IMF agreement because it 
could not meet its foreign exchange requirements. He said that signs of 
recovery could now be seen, as evidenced by the availability of 
clothes, cement and other consumer goods. Although prices were high, at 
least the situation was better than a few years ago when people had to 
buy items such as soap at hiked black market prices. "People used to 
carry money in their stockings because there was a lot of it but very 
little to buy" he said.
Daily News
THE ECONOMY 3. AN INTERIM SITUATION REPORT
There has been a distinct improvement in Tanzanian economic 
performance over the year jnd a half beginning in February 1986. Goods 
are less unavailable, basic services are under less strain, food prices 
fell seasonally, and then rose slowly, morale has improved. Over the 
same period Tanzania has concluded two successive. Economic Recovery 
Programme agreements with the Vorld Bank and bilateral donors, a standby 
facility with the IMF and two rescheduling agreements of the bulk of
its bilateral debt with the Paris Club (OECD governments).
The speed of the shift is related to the atypical background to the 
international endorsement of Tanzania's structural adjustment and
rehabilitation programme. Following a failed 1981-82 programme, when 
Vorld Bank and bilateral negotiations collapsed after an IMF standby had 
been negotiated, Tanzania has had three further structural adjustment 
programmes.
The 1981-82 programme was centred on export rehabilitation. It
raised export volume 30% in 1981 but as prices fell 20% the net foreign 
exchange gain was negligeable and unable to sustain the programme. 1983 
saw the adoption of the report of the 'Three Vise Men' Jointly appointed 
by Tanzania and the Vorld Bank. In retrospect this was a time wasting 
digression for all concerned. The report pleased nobody, had no 
physical or sectoral base and Ignored both budgetary and price 
imbalances.
In 1984 the basic elements of the 1986 strategy (except the rolling 
exchange rate adjustment component) were put in place. The lag in 
negotiating international backing resulted from the unfortunate 
Interaction of a slow Vorld Bank response and the approaching elections.
As a result, as' of early 1986, Tanzania had had three years of 
positive GDP growth behind it; a relatively stable (25 to 35% range) 
inflation rate, falling government bank borrowing, bank credit growth in 
the 15 to 20% range and a number of efficiency reforms ieg. in crop 
pricing and marketing) plus an agenda for rehabilitation and re­
utilisation of capacity. Vhat it did not have - and could never get from 
the export and infrastructural base - was the foreign exchange to
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f i n a n c e  imports to put the rehabilitation excercise in high gear. One 
element in achieving the latter was a shift to regular, moderate 
adjustments of the exchange rate. It moved from about Shsl6 to the US 
dollar in February 1986 to Shs32 in June. After a 25% devaluation to 
Shs 40, adjustments were made to offset Tanzanian inflation and to 
slowly bring the effective rate back to late 1970's levels. By mid-1987 
the rate was around Shs 62 to the dollar which had itself fallen 25%. In 
terms of the pound (a less unstable currency) the change was from about 
Shs 20 in early 1986 to Shs 104 in mid-August 1987.
The devaluation has had limited inflationary impact. The changes up 
to June 1986 were largely absorbed into the actual retail prices which 
valued imports at something nearer the parallel rate (currently Shs 190 
to the pound - Editor) rather than the official rate. Since then 
however, the portions of consumption linked to imports have risen about 
as rapidly as the number of shillings needed to buy a dollar. 1986/87 
Cost of Living increases are of the order of 30% overall but probably 
50% plus on the two fifths of goods and services with significant import 
content.
The relatively good price trends are related to the good 1985 and 
1986 harvests - the first good ones since 1978. Food prices actually 
fell in the second half of 1986 and rose perhaps by 10% during 1986/87. 
Similarly the fall in world oil prices in 1986 helped dampen the impact 
of devaluation on transport costs. The good harvest allowed of the 
establishment of a grain reserve of perhaps 100,000 tons. If the 1987 
crop year has been average, which seems likely (several good, several 
normal zones and only the Kilimanjaro and coast regions having suffered) 
food scarcity should not hamper recovery or affect inflation in 1987/88. 
The key problems will be the restoration of manufactured output levels 
(now perhaps 35% of those in 1978) and the halting of the erosion in 
real wages. The 1987 minimum wage increase is 30% and the target for 
inflation in 1987/88 is from 20% to 25%.
Vhether these goals can be achieved depends on how fast and how 
fully the agreed foreign resource flows arrive. Hormal time lags from 
agreement in principle through detailed negotiation» procurement and 
delivery have meant that, as of mid-1987, external support for the
recovery programme has played little part in economic improvement 
although it has helped to restore morale.
In 1986 GDP is estimated to have risen by 3.6% led by agriculture 
and services. The .1986/87 target of 4.5% should be attained.
The external side of the programme is - unusually - built around the 
accumulated minimum import requirements for current sectoral production 
and rehabilitation targets. It is well designed, has been well received 
and should have begun to pay off by the April/June 1987 quarter.
To date, IMF targets have largely been met. The Recurrent Budget
deficit (certain grants being included as recurrent revenue) was over 
estimated largely because of late financing of 1985/86 overruns and
defence bills related to solidarity with Mozambique. Excluding the
former, domestic government bank borrowing fell dramatically to Shsl.2 
billion. If it is included, the level was Shs3.4 billion compared with a 
target of Shs 2-5 billion. Total bank credit rose about 20% of which 60% 
(Shs 5.3 billion) went to enterprises. The overrun was related to 'a 
sharp rise in cotton production, delays in processing and
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transporting, exacerbated b)f falls in world prices and the rather 
unexpected acquisition of the 100,000 ton grain reserve. In this context 
credit ceilings were renegotiated with the IKF during the first half of 
1987.
The debt rescheduling programme buys some time. Bilateral principal 
and Interest (including arrears) for 1966/90 have been rolied forward to 
1991/99. This is not a permanent solution but, taken together with the 
recovery programme commitments, results in the most positive import 
capacity expansion of any major structural adjustment programme.
Tanzania's stubbornness in sticking to its strategy during the 1980 
to 1986 IKF negotiations did cost time but it also led to succesive 
refinements of domestic strategies and significant Improvements in the 
conditions surrounding external support. Uniquely among large structural 
adjustment programmes the Tanzanian programme has a relatively small IKF 
component (10% odd). Tanzania does not believe that six year money at 8% 
can be a basic means of financing a six to ten year recovery programme 
nor to reducing the external debt problem to manageable levels
The health sector, particularly at rural and urban clinic level, has 
been substantially though not fully rehabilitated. A Danish/UNICEF
project has filled basic drug gaps and related support has allowed for
renewed vaccination of young children.
Education faces more problems. Enrollment is falling at primary 
level even though fees are automatically waved for for children of 
families unable to pay.
The 1986/87 recurrent budget estimated outturn and the 1987/88
estimates show a real increase in health, education and other government 
spending for the first time since 1978/79, This is a major turn-around 
if it can be maintained.
The long term weak link in the strategy remains exports. On
optimistic projections the present programme might raise exports 
(including recaptured smuggled ones) from $400 million in 19.85 to $800 
million in 1990. However, with at least $200 million current account 
debt service and $1,200 million Imports needed to sustain a 5 to 6% 
growth rate in output (a rate likely to be achieved in 1987) there 
remains a current account gap of about $700million. (Future prospects 
are discussed in more detail in the article which follows - Editor).
Domestic manufacturing's slow revival seems to be related to lags in 
disbursement of most import support grants and soft loans. The world 
Bank and UK contributions are exceptions to this. As a 10 to 15% output
recovery in 1987/88 will be crucial to raising GDP from 4.5% to 5% and
to achieving the target of a 20 to 25% rise in cost of living (thus 
making the 30% minimum wage increase translate into a real increase of 
5% (the first real increase since 1973/74) this gives cause for concern.
One hazard to the renewed balance of the recurrent budget is the 
renewed heed to provide solidarity forces - of perhaps 6000 - to
Kozambique. They have been crucial to reversing the tide of the 
'bandidos armados' (KNR) advance in northern Kozambique but they do 
represent a substantial budgetary burden. It is an unavoidable one.
Neither Tanzanian principles, Tanzanian's self-respect nor stability and 
security in southern Tanzania are consistent with failing to avert a
collapse of Kozambique's northern provinces into anarchy or KNR rule.
In short, 1986/87 has seen significant economic recovery. This has
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been built up from the slow bul real partial stabilisation and growth of 
l|83/85. Funds and a framework for utilising them to sustain that 
'recovery in 1987/88 and 1988/89 are pledged and/or in place.
Reginald Herbold Green
THE ECONOMY 4. FUTURE FROSPECTS
In the years between the wars there was a widespread belief In 
certain quarters that, with adequate economic support, economies could 
be both planned and managed by centralised organs of state. The second 
world war, involving rigorous planning for a limited objective, 
appeared to. lend some colour to this view. But the experience7 of the 
USSR and elsewhere has shown clearly that economies are nob machines 
producing predictable results at the press of a button. They are on the 
contrary profoundly influenced, by the decisions and /eactions of 
millions of people. In common parlance these are referred7 to as 'market 
forces', though the phrase suggests some anonymops reagent and 
obscures its real character as the sum of decisions taken by many 
individual human beings. /
The 'rediscovery' of market forces has been a salutory lesson for 
the planners, but the current popularity of bills style of economic 
democracy has gone too far in some quarters. /Market forces, correctly 
interpreted, are an important prime mover in any economy, a fact that 
must never be forgotten; but untutored, nnguided and unaided by the 
state they are likely to remain a somewhat anarchic influence incapable 
of solving the country's most urgent problems.
For Tanzania by far the most pressing and immediate problem is that 
of the foreign exchange gap. Tanzania/ is spending abroad three times as 
much as she is earning by her expopts. In 1986 she was $700 million in 
the red on her trading account. Even then her imports had been reduced 
to the barest necessities, much less than would be required by any self- 
sustaining and developing economy. Development, it must be remembered, 
almost always makes new demands on the foreign exchange account.
The shortfall in Tanzania's foreign exchange earnings represents 
not merely a grossly inadequate income from the sale of exports and 
services to finance the./purchase abroad of essential imports, but also 
insufficiejnt resources, for the funding of external debts, including-debt 
service arrears of $900 million. Fortunately, the debt problem has been 
relieved for the tfme being by agreement with Tanzania's main creditors, 
as indicated in the article above. This concession does not extend to 
obligations due to the IMF which makes the* full payment of arrears a 
first charge on any new loan- a process known as 'rolling over'. These 
alleviations/provide a valuable respite in the administration of 
Tanzania's7foreign exchange and have the additional merit of removing a 
barrier to natural trade relations. But it is essential to bear in mind 
that, unless further concessions are made, the burden of servicing and 
repayment will reappear in the early years of the coming decade, 
considerably increasing the obligations that will at that Juncture have 
to be financed by the sale of goods and services.
The debt overhang, though removed from the present economic context, 
remains a serious threat to future recovery. It is a problem that
-6-
